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If it were possible to predict property price effects during the planning stage of a transport project, the
revenues of such schemes could be taken into account in the financing scheme. Gabriel Ahlfeldt
has constructed such a tool, which may help to realise some projects that are needed but seem
unaffordable. 
In a recent paper forthcoming in Environment and Planning A, I have demonstrated that it is
possible to predict local property price effects of new transport infrastructures using established
urban economics approaches. I have also argued that such predictions can help improve planning.
Property price effects reflect the valuation of location by residents and as such provide an additional
source of valuation that can complement traditional cost-benefit analyses. Perhaps more importantly, I believe that
this approach allows forecasting potential sources of revenues that could contribute the infrastructure funding. Here
is how my argument works:
It is uncontroversial that good transport infrastructure is essential for the functioning of cities. Improvements in the
urban transport system are typically associated with large benefits. As an example, a new transit line can reduce
travel times between various pairs of locations and free up commuting time for which there is better use – be it for
work or leisure. Moreover, the additional capacities may reduce congestion and increase the comfort of journeys not
only along new sections, but along the entire network.
Obviously, the areas close to new infrastructure benefit the most. There is plenty of evidence that the opening of new
metrorail stations significantly increases property prices in the adjoining neighbourhood. This is because buyers
value the infrastructure and, all else being equal, are willing to pay higher prices. Owners of properties that receive a
better connection to a transport network, thus, not only benefit from improved access to transport services, but also
from an increase in the value of their typically largest asset: their property.
But where there are winners, there are typically also losers. For one thing, regional and local transport projects are
often financed, at least in part, using national funds. This implies that money from taxpayers is used even though
they will have little or no benefit from the local infrastructure. Also, whilst renters on the private rental market benefit
from new transport opportunities, at the same time they suffer from increases in market rent. If the increase in
market rent is driven by renters with a higher willingness to pay for proximity to a rail station, the associated rent
increase will more than compensate the renter tenant for the increase in accessibility. The true beneficiary,
obviously, is the local landlord who cashes in on the higher market rent.
One could argue that these imbalances call for an adjustment mechanism that reduces the fraction of tax money
coming from taxpayers who hardly benefit from a project and instead charges those who benefit the most: local
landlords. To be fair to owner-occupiers who haven’t voted for a new rail station, such compensations could be
levied when properties are sold, which is when the asset gain materializes. The methods to empirically separate
property price effects of transport infrastructure improvements from other factors that affect property prices are, by
now, established tool-sets in urban economics. Also, the idea to charge local landlords for wealth increases that
result publicly financed programmes is not new. As an example, in German urban renewal areas landlords are taxed
for the increase in land value caused by public money spent on local improvements in infrastructure and building
maintenance.
My point is that we can take the whole argument about property price effects and compensations one step further. If
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it were possible to predict such property price effects during the planning stage of, say, a transport project, the
revenues of such schemes could be taken into account in the financing scheme. In times of notoriously scarce public
funds, such extra revenues could make a difference when socially desirable projects are at the margin of being
financially viable.
Predicting such property price effects, however, is not exactly straightforward. Take, again, the example of an
addition of a new line to an existing metrorail network. Clearly, prices don’t go up mechanically around new stations,
but the effects depend on where a new station is located within the network, the availability of existing nearby
stations and the attractiveness of alternative transport modes. On top of that, prices also tend to rise along the
existing network if the new line leads to new interchange opportunities. The theoretically attractive feature of the
model I have proposed is that it deals with all of these challenges. To test how well the model does in predicting
price effects in practice, I’ve run a simulation for the 1999 extension of the London Underground and Dockland Light
Railway network (see Figure 1) and compared the predictions to the actual price changes. The encouraging result
was that prices, on average across all affected locations, adjusted almost one to one to the predictions.
Figure 1: Predicted property price effects of the 1999 London Underground and Dockland Light Railway
extension.
Notes: New (old) network sections are in red (grey). 
Coming back to the idea of using compensations from benefiting landlords to fund ambitious transport projects:
Would the amount that could have been levied from landlords have amounted to a substantial contribution to the
London underground and DLR extension in question? Well, the total predicted impact in 1999 prices was £716
million. While this would not have been enough to fully fund the £3.5 billion project it is important to note that this
figure is for residential property only. Moreover, it not only excludes increases in value of non-residential properties,
but also increased revenues from property tax. Still the amount seems far from negligible.
My conclusion is that some projects that are needed but difficult to realise may not turn out to be as unaffordable as
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they initially seem once the wealth effects to local landlords are taken into account. I have proposed a tool that
allows predicting property price effects during the planning stage. In light of the undisputed benefits transport
infrastructures bring to neighbourhoods and cities I argue that it is at least worth considering the potential for
contributions by landlords before dismissing a project due to lack of funds.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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